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Abstract
We study a variant of the source identification game with training data in which part of the training
data is corrupted by an attacker. In the addressed scenario, the defender aims at deciding whether a
test sequence has been drawn according to a discrete memoryless source X ∼ PX , whose statistics are
known to him through the observation of a training sequence generated by X . In order to undermine the
correct decision under the alternative hypothesis that the test sequence has not been drawn from X , the
attacker can modify a sequence produced by a source Y ∼ PY up to a certain distortion, and corrupt the
training sequence either by adding some fake samples or by replacing some samples with fake ones. We
derive the unique rationalizable equilibrium of the two versions of the game in the asymptotic regime
and by assuming that the defender bases its decision by relying only on the first order statistics of the
test and the training sequences. By mimicking Stein’s lemma, we derive the best achievable performance
for the defender when the first type error probability is required to tend to zero exponentially fast with
an arbitrarily small, yet positive, error exponent. We then use such a result to analyze the ultimate
distinguishability of any two sources as a function of the allowed distortion and the fraction of corrupted
samples injected into the training sequence.
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Adversarial Source Identification Game with
Corrupted Training
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial Signal Processing (AdvSP) is an emerging discipline aiming at modelling the interplay
between a defender wishing to carry out a certain processing task, and an attacker aiming at impeding
it [1]. Binary decision in an adversarial setup is one of the most recurrent problems in AdvSP, due to
its importance in many application scenarios. Among binary decision problems, source identification is
one of the most studied subjects, since it lies at the heart of several security-oriented disciplines, like
multimedia forensics, anomaly detection, traffic monitoring, steganalysis and so on.
The source identification game has been introduced in [2] to model the interplay between the defender
and the attacker by resorting to concepts drawn from game and information theory. According to the model
put forward in [2], the defender and the attacker have a perfect knowledge of the to-be-distinguished
sources. In [3] the analysis is pushed a step forward by considering a scenario in which the sources
are known only through the observation of a training sequence. Finally, [4] introduces the security
margin concept, a synthetic parameter characterising the ultimate distinguishability of two sources under
adversarial conditions.
In this paper, we extend the analysis further, by considering a situation in which the attacker may
interfere with the learning phase by corrupting part of the training sequence. Adversarial learning is
a rather novel concept, which has been studied for some years from a machine learning perspective
[5], [6], [7]. Due to the natural vulnerability of machine learning systems, in fact, the attacker may
take an important advantage if no countermeasures are adopted by the defender. The use of a training
sequence to gather information about the statistics of the to-be-distinguished sources can be seen as a
very simple learning mechanism, and the analysis of the impact that an attack carried out in such a phase
has on the performance of a decision system may help shedding new light on this important problem.
To be specific, we extend the game-theoretic framework introduced in [3] and [4] to model a situation
in which the attacker is given the possibility of corrupting part of the training sequence. By adopting a
game-theoretic perspective, we derive the optimal strategy for the defender and the optimal corruption
strategy for the attacker when the length of the training sequence and the observed sequence tends to
infinity. Given such optimum strategies, expressed in the form of game equilibrium point, we analyse the
best achievable performance when the type I and II error probabilities tend to zero exponentially fast.
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Specifically, we study the distinguishability of the sources as a function of the fraction of training samples
corrupted by the attacker and when the test sequence can be modified up to a certain distortion level. The
results of the analysis are summarised in terms of blinding corruption level, defined as the fraction of
corrupted samples making a reliable distinction between the two sources impossible, and security margin,
defined as the maximum distortion of the observed sequence for which a reliable distinction is possible
(see [4]). The analysis is applied to two different scenarios wherein the attacker is allowed respectively
to add a certain amount of fake samples to the training sequence and to selectively replace a fraction
of the samples of the training sequences with fake samples. As we will see, the second case is more
favourable to the attacker, since a lower distortion and a lower number of corrupted training samples are
enough to prevent a correct decision.
Given the above general framework, the main results proven in this paper can be summarised as
follows:
1) We rigorously define the source identification game with addition of corrupted training samples
(SIac-tr game) and show that such a game is a dominance solvable game admitting an asymptotic
equilibrium point when the length of the training and test sequences tend to infinity (Theorem 1
and following discussion in Section III);
2) We evaluate the payoff of the game at the equilibrium and derive the expression of the indistin-
guishability region, defined as the region with the sources Y which can not be distinguished from
X because of the attack (Theorems 2 and 3, Section III);
3) Given any two sources X and Y , we derive the security margin and the blinding corruption level
defined as the maximum distortion introduced into the test sequence and maximum fraction of
fake training samples introduced by the attacker, still allowing the distinction of X and Y while
ensuring positive error exponents for the two kinds of errors of the test (Theorem 4 and Definition
3 in Section V);
4) We repeat the entire analysis for the source identification game with selective replacement of training
samples (SIrc-tr game), and compare the two versions of the game (Theorem 5 and subsequent
discussion in Section VI).
5) The main proofs of the paper rely on a generalised version of Sanov’s theorem [8], [9], which is
proven in Appendix A. In fact, Theorem 6, and its use to simplify some of the proofs in the paper,
can be seen as a further methodological contribution of our work.
This paper considerably extends the analysis presented in [10], by providing a formal proof of the
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results anticipated in [10]1 and make a step forward by studying a more complex corruption scenario
in which the attacker has the freedom to replace a given percentage of the training samples rather than
simply adding some fake samples to the original training sequence.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II summarises the notation used throughout the paper, gives
some definitions and introduces some basics concept of Game theory that will be used in the sequel.
Section III gives a rigorous definition of the SIac-tr game, explaining the rationale behind the various
assumptions made in the definition. In Section IV, we prove the main theorems of the paper regarding
the asymptotic equilibrium point of the SIac-tr game and the payoff at the equilibrium. Section V leverages
on the results proven in Section IV to introduce the concepts of blind corruption level and security margin,
and evaluating them in the setting provided by the SIac-tr game. Section VI, introduces and solves the
SIrc-tr game, by paying attention to compare the results of the analysis with the corresponding results of
the SIac-tr game. The paper ends in Section VII, with a summary of the main results proven in the paper
and the description of possible directions for future work. In order to avoid burdening the main body of
the paper, the most technical details of the proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we introduce the notation and definitions used throughout the paper. We will use capital
letters to indicate discrete memoryless sources (e.g. X). Sequences of length n drawn from a source will
be indicated with the corresponding lowercase letters (e.g. xn); accordingly, xi will denote the i-th
element of a sequence xn. The alphabet of an information source will be indicated by the corresponding
calligraphic capital letter (e.g. X ). The probability mass function (pmf) of a discrete memoryless source
X will be denoted by PX . The calligraphic letter P will be used to indicate the class of all the probability
mass functions, namely, the probability simplex in R|X |. The notation PX will be also used to indicate
the probability measure ruling the emission of sequences from a source X , so we will use the expressions
PX(a) and PX(xn) to indicate, respectively, the probability of symbol a∈X and the probability that the
source X emits the sequence xn, the exact meaning of PX being always clearly recoverable from the
context wherein it is used. We will use the notation PX(A) to indicate the probability of A (be it a subset
of X or X n) under the probability measure PX . Finally, the probability of a generic will be denoted by
Pr{}.
Our analysis relies extensively on the concepts of type and type class defined as follows (see [8] and
[11] for more details). Let xn be a sequence with elements belonging to a finite alphabet X . The type
1We also give a more precise formulation of the problem, by correcting some inaccuracies present in [10].
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Pxn of xn is the empirical pmf induced by the sequence xn, i.e. ∀a∈X ,Pxn(a)= 1n
∑n
i=1δ(xi,a), where
δ(xi,a)=1 if xi=a and zero otherwise. In the following, we indicate with Pn the set of types with
denominator n, i.e. the set of types induced by sequences of length n. Given P∈Pn, we indicate with
T (P ) the type class of P , i.e. the set of all the sequences in X n having type P . We denote by D(P ||Q)
the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between two distributions P and Q, defined on the same finite
alphabet X [8]:
D(P ||Q)=
∑
a∈X
P (a)log2
P (a)
Q(a)
. (1)
Most of our results are expressed in terms of the generalised log-likelihood ratio function h (see [3],
[12], [13]), which for any two given sequences xn and tm is defined as:
h(Pxn ,Ptm)=D(Pxn ||Prn+m)+m
n
D(Ptm ||Prn+m), (2)
where Prn+m denotes the type of the sequence rn+m, obtained by concatenating xn and tm, i.e. rn+m=
xn‖tm. The intuitive meaning behind the above definition is that Prn+m is the pmf which maximises
the probability that a memoryless source generates two independent sequences belonging to T (Pxn) and
T (Ptm), and that such a probability is equal to 2−nh(Pxn ,Ptm ) at the first order in the exponent (see [13]
or Lemma 1 in [3]).
Throughout the paper, we will need to compute limits and distances in P . We can do so by choosing
one of the many available distances defined over R|X | and for which P is a bounded set, for instance
the Lp distance for which we have:
dLp(P,Q)=
(∑
a∈X
|P (a)−Q(a)|p
)1/p
. (3)
Without loss of generality, we will prove all our results by adopting the L1 distance, the generalisation
to different Lp metrics being straightforward. In the sequel, distances between pmf’s in P will be simply
indicated as d(·,·) as a shorthand for dL1(·,·)2.
We also need to introduce the Hausdorff distance as a way to measure distances between subsets of
a metric space [14]. Let S be a generic space and d a distance measure defined over S. For any point
x∈S and any non-empty subset A⊆S, the distance of x from the subset A is defined as:
d(x,A) = inf
a∈A
d(a,x). (4)
Given the above definition, the Hausdorff distance between any two subsets of S is defined as follows.
2Throughout the paper, we will use the symbol d(·,·) to indicate both the distortion between two sequences in Xn and the
L1 distance between two pmf’s in P , the exact meaning being always clear from the context,
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Definition 1. For any two subsets A and B of S, let us define δB(A)=supb∈Bd(b,A). The Hausdorff
distance δH(A,B) between A and B is given by:
δH(A,B) = max{δA(B),δB(A)}. (5)
If the sets A and B are bounded with respect to d, then the Hausdorff distance always takes a finite value.
The Hausdorff distance does not define a true metric, but only a pseudometric, since δH(A,B)=0 implies
that the closures of the sets A and B coincide, namely cl(A)=cl(B), but not necessarily that A=B. For
this reason, in order for δH to be a metric, we need to restrict its definition to closed subsets3. Let then
L(S) denote the space of non-empty closed and limited subsets of S and let δH :L(S)×L(S)→[0,∞).
Then, the space L(S) endowed with the Hausdorff distance is a metric space [15] and we can give the
following definition:
Definition 2. Let {Kn} be a sequence of closed and limited subsets of S, i.e., Kn∈L(S) ∀n. We use the
notation Kn
H→ K to indicate that the sequence has limit in (L(S),δH) and the limiting set is K.
A. Basic notions of Game Theory
In this section, we introduce some basic notions and definitions of Game Theory.
A 2-player game is defined as a quadruple (S1,S2,u1,u2), where S1={s1,1...s1,n1} and S2={s2,1...s2,n2}
are the set of strategies the first and the second player can choose from, and ul(s1,i,s2,j),l=1,2, is the
payoff of the game for player l, when the first player chooses the strategy s1,i and the second chooses
s2,j . A pair of strategies (s1,i,s2,j) is called a profile. When u1(ss1,i,s2,j)=−u2(s1,i,s2,j), the win of a
player is equal to the loss of the other and the game is said to be a zero-sum game. The sets S1, S2
and the payoff functions are assumed to be known to both players. Throughout the paper we consider
strategic games, i.e., games in which the players choose their strategies beforehand without knowing the
strategy chosen by the opponent player.
The final goal of game theory is to determine the existence of equilibrium points, i.e. profiles that in
some sense represent the best choice for both players [16]. The most famous notion of equilibrium is due
to Nash. A profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve its payoff by changing its
strategy unilaterally. Despite its popularity, the practical meaning of Nash equilibrium is often unclear,
since there is no guarantee that the players will end up playing at the equilibrium. A particular kind of
games for which stronger forms of equilibrium exist are the so called dominance solvable games [16].
3Note that in this case the inf and sup operations involved in the definition of the Hausdorff distance can be replaced with
min and max, respectively.
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To be specific, a strategy is said to be strictly dominant for one player if it is the best strategy for the
player, i.e., the strategy which corresponds to the largest payoff, no matter how the other player decides
to play. When one such strategy exists for one of the players, he will surely adopt it. In a similar way, we
say that a strategy sl,i is strictly dominated by strategy sl,j , if the payoff achieved by player l choosing
sl,i is always lower than that obtained by playing sl,j regardless of the choice made by the other player.
The recursive elimination of dominated strategies is a common technique for solving games. In the first
step, all the dominated strategies are removed from the set of available strategies, since no rational player
would ever play them. In this way, a new, smaller game is obtained. At this point, some strategies, that
were not dominated before, may be dominated in the remaining game, and hence are eliminated. The
process goes on until no dominated strategy exists for any player. A rationalizable equilibrium is any
profile which survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies [17], [18]. If at the end of the
process only one profile is left, the remaining profile is said to be the only rationalizable equilibrium of
the game. The corresponding strategies are the only rational choice for the two players and the game is
said dominance solvable.
III. SOURCE IDENTIFICATION GAME WITH ADDITION OF CORRUPTED TRAINING SAMPLES (SIac-tr)
In this section, we give a rigorous definition of the Source Identification game with addition of corrupted
training samples.
Given a discrete and memoryless source X∼PX and a test sequence vn, the goal of the defender (D)
is to decide whether vn has been drawn from X (hypothesis H0) or not (alternative hypothesis H1).
By adopting a Neyman-Pearson perspective, we assume that D must ensure that the false positive error
probability (Pfp), i.e., the probability of rejecting H0 when H0 holds (type I error) is lower than a given
threshold. Similarly to the previous versions of the game studied in [2] and [3], we assume that D relies
only on first order statistics to make a decision. For mathematical tractability, likewise earlier papers, we
study the asymptotic version of the game when n→∞, by requiring that Pfp decays exponentially fast
when n increases, with an error exponent at least equal to λ, i.e. Pfp≤2−nλ. On its side, the attacker
aims at increasing the false negative error probability (Pfn), i.e., the probability of accepting H0 when
H1 holds (type II error). Specifically, A takes a sequence yn drawn from a source Y∼PY and modifies
it in such a way that D decides that the modified sequence zn has been generated by X . In doing so, A
must respect a distortion constraint requiring that the average per-letter distortion between yn and zn is
lower than L.
Players A and D know the statistics of X through a training sequence, however the training sequence
can be partly corrupted by A. Depending on how the training sequence is modified by the attacker, we
can define different versions of the game. In this paper, we focus on two possible cases: in the first case,
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hereafter referred to as source identification game with addition of corrupted samples SIac-tr, the attacker
can add some fake samples to the original training sequence. In the second case, analysed in Section VI,
the attacker can replace some of the training samples with fake values (source identification game with
replacement of training samples - SIrc-tr). It is worth stressing that, even if the goal of the attacker is to
increase the false negative error probability, the training sequence is corrupted regardless of whether H0
or H1 holds, hence, in general, this part of the attack also affects the false positive error probability. As
it will be clear later on, this forces the defender to adopt a worst case perspective to ensure that Pfp is
surely lower than 2−λn.
As to Y , we assume that the attacker knows PY exactly. For a proper definition of the payoff of the
game, we also assume that D knows PY . This may seem a too strong assumption, however we will show
later on that the optimum strategy of D does not depend on PY , thus allowing us to relax the assumption
that D knows PY .
With the above ideas in mind, we are now ready to give a formal definition of the SIac-tr game.
A. Structure of the SIac-tr game
A schematic representation of the SIac-tr game is given in Figure 1.
Let τm1 be a sequence drawn from X . We assume that τm1 is accessible to A, who corrupts it by
concatenating to it a sequence of fake samples τm2 . Then A reorders the overall sequence in a random
way so to hide the position of the fake samples. Note that reordering does not alter the statistics of the
training sequence since the sequence is supposed to be generated from a memoryless source4. In the
following, we denote by m the final length of the training sequence (m=m1+m2), and by α= m2m1+m2
the portion of fake samples within it. The corrupted training sequence observed by D is indicated by
tm. Eventually, we hypothesize a linear relationship between the lengths of the test and the corrupted
training sequence, i.e. m=cn, for some constant value c5.
The goal of D is to decide if an observed sequence vn has been drawn from the same source that
generated tm (H0) or not (H1). We assume that D knows that a certain percentage of samples in the
4By using the terminology introduced in [6], the above scenario can be referred to as a causative attack with control over
training data.
5In this paper, we are interested in studying the equilibrium point of the source identification game when the length of the
test and training sequences tend to infinity. Strictly speaking, we should ensure that when n grows, all the quantities m, m1
and m2 are integer numbers for the given c and α. In practice, we will neglect such an issue, since when n grows the ratios
m/n and m1/(m1+m2) can approximate any real values c and α. More rigorously, we could consider only rational values of
c and α, and focus on subsequences of n including only those values for which m/n=c and m1/(m1+m2)=α.
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A
X
Y
yn
xn
τm1
zn (d(zn, yn) < nL)
D
H0/H1
vn
A
tm = σ(τm1||τm2)
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the SIac-tr game. Symbol || denotes concatenation of sequences and σ() is a random
permutation of sequence samples.
training sequence are corrupted, but he has no clue about the position of the corrupted samples. The
attacker can also modify the sequence generated by Y so to induce a decision error. The corrupted
sequence is indicated by zn. With regard to the two phases of the attack, we assume that A first corrupts
the training sequence, then he modifies the sequence yn. This means that, in general, zn will depend both
on yn and tm, while tm (noticeably τm2) does not depend on yn. Stated in another way, the corruption of
the training sequence can be seen as a preparatory part of the attack, whose goal is to ease the subsequent
camouflage of yn.
For a formal definition of the SIac-tr game, we must define the set of strategies available to D and A
(respectively SD and SA) and the corresponding payoffs.
B. Defender’s strategies
The basic assumption behind the definition of the space of strategies available to D is that to make his
decision D relies only on the first order statistics of vn and tm. This assumption is equivalent to requiring
that the acceptance region for hypothesis H0, hereafter referred to as Λn×m, is a union of pairs of type
classes6, or equivalently, pairs of types (P,R), where P∈Pn and R∈Pm. To define Λn×m, D follows
a Neyman-Pearson approach, requiring that the false positive error probability is lower than a certain
threshold. Specifically, we require that the false positive error probability tends to zero exponentially fast
with a decay rate at least equal to λ. Given that the pmf PX ruling the emission of sequences under H0
is not known and given that the corruption of the training sequence is going to impair D’s decision under
6We use the superscript n×m to indicate explicitly that Λn×m refers to n-long test sequences and (m=cn)-long training
sequences.
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H0, we adopt a worst case approach and require that the constraint on the false positive error probability
holds for all possible PX and for all the possible strategies available to the attacker. Given the above
setting, the space of strategies available to D is defined as follows:
SD={Λn×m⊂Pn×Pm: max
PX∈P
max
s∈SA
Pfp ≤ 2−λn}, (6)
where the inner maximization is performed over all the strategies available to the attacker. We will refine
this definition at the end of the next section, after the exact definition of the space of strategies of the
attacker.
C. Attacker’s strategies
With regard to A, the attack consists of two parts. Given a sequence yn drawn from PY , and the
original training sequence τm1 , the attacker first generates a sequence of fake samples τm2 and mixes
them up with those in τm1 producing the training sequence tm observed by D. Then he transforms yn
into zn, eventually trying to generate a pair of sequences (zn,tm)7 whose types belong to Λn×m. In doing
so, he must ensure that d(yn,zn)≤nL for some distortion function d.
Let us consider the corruption of the training sequence first. Given that the defender bases his decision
only on the type of tm, we are only interested in the effect that the addition of the fake samples has on
Ptm . By considering the different length of τm1 and τm2 , we have:
Ptm=αPτm2 +(1−α)Pτm1 , (7)
where Ptm∈Pm, Pτm1∈Pm1 and Pτm2∈Pm2 . The first part of the attack, then, is equivalent to choosing
a pmf in Pm2 and mixing it up with Pτm1 . By the same token, it is reasonable to assume that the choice
of the attacker depends only on Pτm1 rather than on the single sequence τm1 . Arguably, the best choice
of the pmf in Pm2 will depend on PY , since the corruption of the training sequence is instrumental
in letting the defender think that a sequence generated by Y has been drawn by the same source that
generated tm.
To describe the part of the attack applied to the test sequence, we follow the approach used in [4] based
on transportation theory [19]. Let us indicate by n(i,j) the number of times that the i-th symbol of the
alphabet is transformed into the j-th one as a consequence of the attack. Similarly, let SnY Z(i,j)=n(i,j)/n
be the relative frequency with which such a transformation occurs. In the following, we refer to SnY Z as
7While reordering is essential to hide the position of fake samples to D, it does not have any impact on the position of (zn,tm)
with respect to Λn×m, since we assumed that the defender bases its decision only on the first order statistic of the observed
sequences. For this reason, we omit to indicate the reordering operator σ in the attacking procedure.
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transportation map. For any additive distortion measure, the distortion introduced by the attack can be
expressed in terms of n(i,j) and SnY Z . In fact, we have:
d(yn,zn) =
∑
i,j
n(i,j)d(i,j), (8)
d(yn,zn)
n
=
∑
i,j
SnY Z(i,j)d(i,j). (9)
where d(i,j) is the distortion introduced when symbol i is transformed into symbol j.
The map SnY Z also determines the type of the attacked sequence. In fact, by indicating with Pzn(j)
the relative frequency of symbol j into zn, we have:
Pzn(j) =
∑
i
SnY Z(i,j) , SnZ(j). (10)
Finally, we observe that the attacker can not change more symbols than there are in the sequence yn;
as a consequence a map SnY Z can be applied to a sequence y
n only if SnY (i),
∑
jS
n
Y Z(i,j)=Pyn(i).
Sometimes, we find convenient to explicit the dependence of the map chosen by the attacker on the type
of tm and yn, and hence we will also adopt the notation SnY Z(Ptm ,Pyn).
By remembering that Λn×m depends on vn only through its type, and given that the type of the attacked
sequence depends on SnY only through S
n
Y Z , we can define the second phase of the attack as the choice
of a transportation map among all admissible maps, a map being admissible if:
SnY = Pyn (11)∑
i,j
SnY Z(i,j)d(i,j) ≤ L.
Hereafter, we will refer to the set of admissible maps as An(L,Pyn).
With the above ideas in mind, the set of strategies of the attacker can be defined as follows:
SA = SA,T×SA,O, (12)
where SA,T and SA,O indicate, respectively, the part of the attack affecting the training sequence and the
observed sequence, and are defined as:
SA,T =
{
Q(Pτm1 ): Pm1→Pm2
}
, (13)
SA,O =
{
SnY Z(Pyn ,Ptm): Pn×Pm→An(L,Pyn)
}
. (14)
Note that the first part of the attack (SA,T ) is applied regardless of whether H0 or H1 holds, while the
second part (SA,O) is applied only under H1. We also stress that the choice of Q(Pτm1 ) depends only
on the training sequence τm1 , while the transportation map used in the second phase of the attack is a
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function of both on yn and τm1 (through tm). Finally, we observe that with these definitions, the set of
strategies of the defender can be redefined by explicitly indicating that the constraint on the false positive
error probability must be verified for all possible choices of Q(·)∈SA,T , since this is the only part of the
attack affecting Pfp. Specifically, we can rewrite (6) as
SD={Λn×m⊂Pn×Pm: max
PX
max
Q(·)∈SA,T
Pfp ≤ 2−λn}. (15)
D. Payoff
The payoff is defined in terms of the false negative error probability, namely:
u(Λn×m,(Q(·), SnY Z(·,·))) = −Pfn. (16)
Of course, D aims at maximising u while A wants to minimise it.
E. The SIac-tr game with targeted corruption (SI
a,t
c-tr game)
The SIac-tr game is difficult to solve directly, because of the 2-step attacking strategy. We will work
around this difficulty by tackling first with a slightly different version of the game, namely the source
identification game with targeted corruption of the training sequence, SIa,tc-tr, depicted in Fig. 2.
Whereas the strategies available to the defender remain the same, for the attacker, the choice of Q(·)
is targeted to the counterfeiting of a given sequence yn. In other words, we will assume that the attacker
corrupts the training sequence τm1 to ease the counterfeiting of a specific sequence yn rather than to
increase the probability that the second part of the attack succeeds. This means that the part of the attack
aiming at corrupting the training sequence also depend on yn, that is:
SA,T =
{
Q(Pτm1 ,Pyn): Pm1×Pn→Pm2
}
. (17)
Even if this setup is not very realistic and is more favourable to the attacker, who can exploit the exact
knowledge of yn (rather than its statistical properties) also for the corruption of the training sequence, in
the next section we will show that, for large n, the SIa,tc-tr game is equivalent to the non-targeted version
of the game we are interested in.
With the above ideas in mind, the SIa,tc-tr game is formally defined as follows.
1) Defender’s strategies:
SD={Λn×m⊂Pn×Pm: max
PX
max
Q(·,·)∈SA,T
Pfp≤2−λn}. (18)
2) Attacker’s strategies:
SA = SA,T×SA,O (19)
with SA,T and SA,O defined as in (17) and (14) respectively.
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A
X
Y
yn
xn
τm1 zn (d(zn, yn) < nL)
tm = σ(τm1||τm2)
D
H0/H1
vn
Fig. 2. SIac-tr game with targeted corruption of the training sequence.
3) Payoff: The payoff is still equal to the false negative error probability:
u(Λn×m,(Q(·,·), SnY Z(·,·))) = −Pfn. (20)
IV. ASYMPTOTIC EQUILIBRIUM AND PAYOFF OF THE SIa,tc-tr AND SI
a
c-tr GAMES
In this section, we derive the asymptotic equilibrium point of the SIa,tc-tr and the SI
a
c-tr games when
the length of the test and training sequences tends to infinity and evaluate the payoff at the equilibrium.
A. Optimum defender’s strategy
We start by deriving the asymptotically optimum strategy for D. As we will see, a dominant and
universal strategy with respect to PY exists for D. In other words, the optimum choice of D depends on
neither the strategy chosen by the attacker nor PY . In addition, since the constraint on the false positive
probability must be satisfied for all attackers’ strategy, the optimum strategy for the defender is the same
for both the targeted and non-targeted versions of the game.
As a first step, we look for an explicit expression of the false positive error probability. Such a
probability depends on PX and on the strategy used by A to corrupt the training sequence. In fact, the
mapping of yn into zn does not have any impact on D’s decision under H0. We carry out our derivations
by focusing on the game with targeted corruption. It will be clear from our analysis that the dependence
on yn has no impact on Pfp, and hence the same results hold for the game with non-targeted corruption.
For a given PX and Q(·,·), Pfp is equal to the probability that Y generates a sequence yn and X
generates two sequences xn and τm1 , such that the pair of type classes (Pxn ,αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn)+(1−α)Pτm1 )
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falls outside Λn×m. Such a probability can be expressed as:
Pfp = Pr{(Pxn ,αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn)+(1−α)Pτm1 )∈Λ¯n×m}
=
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))· (21)
∑
(Pxn ,Ptm )∈Λ¯n×m
PX(T (Pxn))·
∑
Pτm1∈Pm1 :
αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn )+(1−α)Pτm1 =Ptm
PX(T (Pτm1 )),
where Λ¯n×m is the complement of Λn×m, and where we have exploited the fact that under H0 the training
sequence τm1 and the test sequence xn are generated independently by X . Given the above formulation,
the set of strategies available to D can be rewritten as:
SD=
{
Λn×m: max
PX
max
Q(·,·)
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))· (22)
∑
(Pxn ,Ptm )∈Λ¯n×m
PX(T (Pxn))·
∑
Pτm1∈Pm1 :
αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn )+(1−α)Pτm1 =Ptm
PX(T (Pτm1 ))≤2−λn
}
.
We are now ready to prove the following lemma, which describes the asymptotically optimum strategy
for the defender for both versions of the game.
Lemma 1. Let Λn×m,∗ be defined as follows:
Λn×m,∗=
{
(Pvn ,Ptm): min
Q∈Pm2
h
(
Pvn ,
Ptm−αQ
1−α
)
≤ λ−δn
}
(23)
with
δn=|X | log(n+1)((1−α)nc+1)
n
, (24)
where |X | is the cardinality of the source alphabet and where the minimisation over Q is limited to all
the Q’s such that Ptm−αQ is nonnegative for all the symbols in X .
Then:
1) max
PX
max
s∈SA
Pfp ≤ 2−n(λ−νn), with lim
n→∞νn=0,
2) ∀Λn×m ∈ SD, we have Λ¯n×m⊆Λ¯n×m,∗.
March 29, 2017 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. X, NO. X, XXXXXXX XXXX 14
Proof. To prove the first part of the lemma, we see that from the expression of the false positive error
probability given by eq. (21), we can write:
max
PX
max
Q(·,·)
Pfp ≤ (25)
max
PX
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))·
∑
(Pxn ,Ptm )
∈Λ¯n×m,∗
PX(T (Pxn))·
max
Q(·,·)
∑
Pτm1∈Pm1 :
αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn )+(1−α)Pτm1 =Ptm
PX(T (Pτm1 )). (26)
Let us consider the term within the inner summation. For each Pτm1 such that αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn)+(1−
α)Pτm1 =Ptm , we have8:
PX(T (Pτm1 )) ≤ max
Q∈Pm2
PX
(
T
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α
))
, (27)
with the understanding that the maximisation is carried out only over the Q’s such that Ptm−αQ is
nonnegative for all the symbols in X .
Thanks to the above observation, we can upper bound the false positive error probability as follows:
max
PX
max
Q(·,·)
Pfp ≤ (28)
max
PX
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))·
∑
(Pxn ,Ptm )
∈Λ¯n×m,∗
PX(T (Pxn))·|Pm1 |· max
Q∈Pm2
PX
(
T
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α
))
(a)
=max
PX
∑
(Pxn ,Ptm )
∈Λ¯n×m,∗
PX(T (Pxn))|Pm1 | max
Q∈Pm2
PX
(
T
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α
))
≤|Pm1 |
∑
(Pxn ,Ptm )
∈Λ¯n×m,∗
max
Q∈Pm2
max
PX
PX(T (Pxn))PX
(
T
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α
))
where in (a) we exploited the fact that the rest of the expression no longer depends on Pyn . From
this point, the proof goes along the same line of the proof of Lemma 2 in [3], by observing that
maxPXPX(T (Pxn))PX
(
T
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α
))
is upper bounded by 2−nh(Pxn ,
Ptm−αQ
1−α ), and that for each pair of
types in Λ¯n×m,∗, h(Pxn ,Pt
m−αQ
1−α ) is larger than λ−δn for every Q by the very definition of Λn×m,∗.
We now pass to the second part of the lemma. Let Λn×m be a strategy in SD, and let (Pxn ,Ptm) be
a pair of types contained in Λ¯n×m. Given that Λn×m is an admissible decision region (see (18)), the
8It is easy to see that the bound (27) holds also for the non-targeted game, when Q depends on the training sequence only
(Q(Pτm1 )).
March 29, 2017 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. X, NO. X, XXXXXXX XXXX 15
probability that X emits a test sequence belonging to T (Pxn) and a training sequence τm1 such that after
the attack (τm1 ||τm2)∈T (Ptm) must be lower than 2−λn for all PX and all possible attacking strategies,
that is:
2−λn > max
PX
max
Q(·,·)
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))· (29)
[
PX(T (Pxn)) ·
∑
Pτm1 :
αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn )+(1−α)Pτm1 =Ptm
PX(T (Pτm1 ))
]
(a)
= max
PX
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))·
[
PX(T (Pxn))· max
Q(·,Pyn )
∑
Pτm1 :
αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn )+(1−α)Pτm1 =Ptm
PX(T (Pτm1 ))
]
(b)
≥ max
PX
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))·
[
PX(T (Pxn))·
max
Q(Pτm1 ,Pyn )
PX
(
T
(
Ptm−αQ(Pτm1 ,Pyn)
1−α
))]
(c)
= max
PX
PX(T (Pxn)) max
Q∈Pm2
PX
(
T
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α
))
,
where (a) is obtained by replacing the maximisation over all possible strategies Q(·,·), with a maximisa-
tion over Q(·,Pyn) for each specific Pyn , and (b) is obtained by considering only one term Pτm1 of the
inner summation and optimising Q(Pτm1 ,Pyn) for that term. Finally, (c) follows by observing that the
optimum Q(·,Pyn) is the same for any Pyn . As usual, the maximization over Q in the last expression is
restricted to the Q’s for which Ptm−αQ ≥ 0 for all the symbols in X 9
By lower bounding the probability that a memoryless source X generates a sequence belonging to a
9It is easy to see that the same lower bound can be derived also for the non targeted case, as the optimum Q in the second
to last expression does not depend on Pyn .
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certain type class (see [8], chapter 12), we can continue the above chain of inequalities as follows
2−λn >
max
PX
max
Q∈Pm2
2−n
[
D(Pxn ||PX)+m1n D
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α ||PX
)]
(n+1)|X |(m1+1)|X |
(30)
≥ 2
−n min
Q∈Pm2
min
PX
[
D(Pxn ||PX)+m1n D
(
Ptm−αQ
1−α ||PX
)]
(n+1)|X |(m1+1)|X |
(a)
=
2
−n min
Q∈Pm2
h
(
Pxn ,
Ptm−αQ
1−α
)
(n+1)|X |(m1+1)|X |
,
where (a) derives from the minimization properties of the generalised log-likelihood ratio function h()
(see Lemma 1, in [3]). By taking the log of both terms we have:
min
Q∈Pm2
h
(
Pxn ,
Ptm−αQ
1−α
)
> λ−δn, (31)
thus completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 1 shows that the strategy Λn×m,∗ is asymptotically admissible (point 1) and optimal (point 2),
regardless of the attack. From a game-theoretic perspective, this means that such a strategy is a dominant
strategy for D and implies that the game is dominance solvable [17]. Similarly, the optimum strategy is
a semi-universal one, since it depends on PX but it does not depend on PY .
It is clear from the proof of Lemma 1 that the same optimum strategy holds for the targeted and
non-targeted versions of the game. The situation is rather different with regard to the optimum strategy
for the attacker. Despite the existence of a dominant strategy for the defender, in fact, the identification
of the optimum attacker’s strategy for the SIac-tr game is not easy due to the 2-step nature of the attack.
For this reason, in the following sections, we will focus on the targeted version of the game, which is
easier to study. We will then use the results obtained for the SIa,tc-tr game to derive the best achievable
performance for the case of non-targeted attack.
B. The SIa,tc-tr game: optimum attacker’s strategy and equilibrium point
Given the dominant strategy of D, for any given τm1 and yn, the optimum attacker’s strategy for the
SIa,tc-tr game boils down to the following double minimisation:
(Q∗(Pτm1 ,Pyn), S
n,∗
Y Z(Pyn ,Ptm)) = (32)
arg min
Q∈Pm2
SnY Z∈An(L,Pyn )
(
min
Q′
h
(
Pzn ,
(1−α)Pτm1 +αQ−αQ′
1−α
))
,
where Pzn is obtained by applying the transformation map SnY Z to Pyn , and where Ptm=(1−α)Pτm1 +αQ.
As usual, the minimisation over Q′ is limited to the Q′ such that all the entries of the resulting pmf are
nonnegative.
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As a remark, for L=0 (corruption of the training sequence only), we get:
Q∗(Pτm1 ,Pyn) =
arg min
Q∈Pm2
[
min
Q′
h
(
Pyn , Pτm1 +
α
1−α(Q−Q
′)
)]
, (33)
while, for α=0 (classical setup, without corruption of the training sequence) we have:
Sn,∗Y Z(Pyn ,Ptm)= argmin
SnY Z∈An(L,Pyn )
h(Pzn ,Ptm), (34)
falling back to the known case of source identification with uncorrupted training, already studied in [3].
Having determined the optimum strategies of both players, it is immediate to state the following:
Theorem 1. The SIa,tc-tr game is a dominance solvable game, whose only rationalizable equilibrium
corresponds to the profile (Λn×m,∗,(Q∗(P ·,·), Sn,∗Y Z(·,·)).
Proof. The theorem is a direct consequence of the fact that Λn×m,∗ is a dominant strategy for D.
We remind that the concept of rationalizable equilibrium is much stronger than the usual notion of
Nash equilibrium, since the strategies corresponding to such an equilibrium are the only ones that two
rational players may adopt [16], [17].
C. The SIa,tc-tr game: payoff at the equilibrium
In this section, we derive the asymptotic value of the payoff at the equilibrium, to see who and under
which conditions is going to win the game.
To start with, we identify the set of pairs (Pyn ,Pτm1 ) for which, as a consequence of A’s action, D
accepts H0:
Γn(λ,α,L) = {(Pyn ,Pτm1 ): ∃ (Pzn ,Ptm)∈Λn×m,∗ (35)
s.t. Ptm=(1−α)Pτm1 +αQ and Pzn=SnZ
for some Q∈Pm2 and SnY Z∈A(L,Pyn)}.
If we fix the type of the non-corrupted training sequence (Pτm1 ), we obtain:
Γn(Pτm1 ,λ,α,L)={Pyn : ∃ Pzn∈Λn,∗((1−α)Pτm1 +αQ) (36)
s.t. Pzn=SnZ
for some Q∈Pm2 and SnY Z∈A(L,Pyn)},
where Λn,∗(P ) denotes the acceptance region for a fixed type of the training sequence in Pm. It is
interesting to notice that, since in the current setting A has two degrees of freedom, the attack has a
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twofold effect: the sequence yn is modified in order to bring it inside the acceptance region Λn,∗(Ptm)
and the acceptance region itself is modified so to facilitate the former action.
To go on, we find it convenient to rewrite the set Γn(Pτm1 ,λ,α,L) as follows:
Γn(Pτm1 ,λ,α,L) = (37)
{Pyn : ∃SnPV ∈ A(L,Pyn) s.t. SnV ∈ Γn0 (Pτm1 ,λ,α)},
where
Γn0 (Pτm1 ,λ,α)= (38)
{Pyn : ∃Q ∈ Pm2 s.t. Pyn∈Λn,∗((1−α)Pτm1 +αQ)},
is the set containing all the test sequences (or, equivalently, test types) for which it is possible to corrupt
the training set in such a way that they fall within the acceptance region. As the subscript 0 suggests,
this set corresponds to the set in (36) when A cannot modify the sequence drawn from Y (i.e. L=0) and
then tries to hamper the decision by corrupting the training sequence only.
By considering the expression of the acceptance region, the set Γn0 (Pτm1 ,λ,α) can be expressed in a
more explicit form as follows:
Γn0 (Pτm1 ,λ,α) =
{
Pyn : ∃Q,Q′ ∈ Pm2 s.t. (39)
h
(
Pyn ,Pτm1 +
α
(1−α)(Q−Q
′)
)
≤ λ−δn
}
,
where the second argument of h() denotes a type in Pm1 obtained from the original training sequence
τm1 by first adding m2 samples and later removing (in a possibly different way) the same number of
samples. Note that in this formulation Q accounts for the fake samples introduced by the attacker and Q′
for the worst case guess made by the defender of the position of the corrupted samples. We also observe
that since we are treating the SIa,tc-tr game, in general Q will depend on Pyn . As usual, we implicitly
assume that Q and Q′ are chosen in such a way that Pτm1 + α(1−α)(Q−Q′) is nonnegative and smaller
than or equal to 1 for all the alphabet symbols.
We are now ready to derive the asymptotic payoff of the game by following a path similar to that used
in [2], [3]. First of all we generalise the definition of the sets Λn×m,∗, Γn and Γn0 so that they can be
evaluated for a generic pmf in P (that is, without requiring that the pmf’s are induced by sequences of
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finite length). This step passes through the generalization of the h function. Specifically, given any pair
of pmf’s (P,P ′)∈P×P , we define:
hc(P,P
′) = D(P ||U) + cD(P ′||U); (40)
U =
1
1+c
P +
c
1+c
P ′,
where c∈[0,1]. Note that when (P,P ′)∈Pn×Pn, hc(P,P ′)=h(P,P ′). The asymptotic version of Λn×m,∗
is:
Λ∗=
{
(P,R) : min
Q
hc
(
P,
R−αQ
1−α
)
≤ λ
}
. (41)
In a similar way, we can derive the asymptotic versions of Γn and Γn0 in (37) and (38)-(39). To do so,
we first observe that, the transportation map SnY Z depends on the sources only through the pmfs. By
denoting with SnPV a transportation map from a pmf P∈Pn to another pmf V ∈Pn and rewriting the set
Γn accordingly, we can easily derive the asymptotic version of the set as follows:
Γ(R,λ,α,L) = {P∈P: ∃SPV ∈A(L,P ) s.t. V ∈Γ0(R,λ,α)}, (42)
with
Γ0(R,λ,α) = (43)
{P∈P: ∃Q∈P s.t. P∈Λ∗((1−α)R+αQ)} ={
P∈P: ∃Q,Q′∈P s.t. hc
(
P, R+
α
(1−α)(Q−Q
′)
)
≤ λ
}
,
where the definitions of SPV and A(L,P ) derive from those of SnPV and An(L,P ) by relaxing the
requirement that the terms SPV (i,j) and P (i) are rational number with denominator n. We now have all
the necessary tools to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic payoff of the SIa,tc-tr game). For the SI
a,t
c-tr game, the false negative error
exponent at the equilibrium is given by
ε = min
R
[(1−α)cD(R||PX)+ min
P∈Γ(R,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY )]. (44)
Accordingly,
1) if PY ∈ Γ(PX ,λ,α,L) then ε = 0;
2) if PY /∈ Γ(PX ,λ,α,L) then ε > 0.
Proof. The theorem could be proven going along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 4 in [3].
We instead provide a proof based on the extension of Sanov’s theorem provided in the Appendix (see
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Theorem 6). In fact, Theorem 2, as well as Theorem 4 in [3], can be seen as an application of such a
generalized version of Sanov’s theorem.
Let us consider
Pfn =
∑
(Pyn ,Pτm1 )∈Γn(λ,α,L)
PX(T (Pτm1 ))PY (T (Pyn)) (45)
=
∑
R∈Pm1
PX(T (R))
∑
P∈Γn(R,λ,α,L)
PY (T (P ))
=
∑
R∈Pm1
PX(T (R))PY (Γ
n(R,λ,α,L)).
We start by deriving an upper-bound of the false negative error probability. We can write:
Pfn ≤
∑
R∈Pm1
PX(T (R))
∑
P∈Γn(R,λ,α,L)
2−nD(P ||PY )
≤
∑
R∈Pm1
PX(T (R))(n+1)
|X |2
−n min
P∈Γn(R,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY )
≤
∑
R∈Pm1
PX(T (R))(n+1)
|X |2
−n min
P∈Γ(R,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY )
≤ (n+1)|X |(m1+1)|X |
·2−n minR∈Pm1 [
m1
n
D(R||PX)+ min
P∈Γ(R,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY )]
≤ (n+1)|X |(m1+1)|X |
·2−nminR∈P[(1−α)cD(R||PX)+ minP∈Γ(R,λ,α,L)D(P ||PY )], (46)
where the use of the minimum instead of the infimum is justified by the fact that Γn(R,λ,α,L) and
Γ(R,λ,α,L) are compact sets. By taking the log and dividing by n we find:
− logPfn
n
≥
min
R∈P
[
(1−α)cD(R||PX)+ min
P∈Γ(R,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY )
]−βn, (47)
where βn=|X | log(n+1)((1−α)nc+1)n tends to 0 when n tends to infinity.
We now turn to the analysis of a lower bound for Pfn. Let R∗ be the pmf achieving the minimum in
the outer minimisation of eq. (44). Due to the density of rational numbers within real numbers, we can
find a sequence of pmfs’ Rm1∈Pm1 (m1=(1−α)nc) that tends to R∗ when n (and hence m1) tends to
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infinity. We can write:
Pfn=
∑
R∈Pm1
PX(T (R))PY (Γ
n(R,λ,α,L))
≥ PX(T (Rm1))PY (Γn(Rm1 ,λ,α,L)),
≥ 2
−m1D(Rm1 ||PX)
(m1+1)|X |
PY (Γ
n(Rm1 ,λ,α,L)), (48)
where in the first inequality we have replaced the sum with the single element of the subsequence Rm1
defined previously, and where the second inequality derives from the well known lower bound on the
probability of a type class [8]. From (48), by taking the log and dividing by n, we obtain:
− logPfn
n
≤
(1−α)cD(Rm1 ||PX)−
1
n
logPY (Γ
n(Rm1 ,λ,α,L))+β
′
n, (49)
where β′n=|X | log(m1+1)n tends to 0 when n tends to infinity. In order to compute the probability PY (Γn(Rm1 ,λ,α,L)),
we resort to Corollary 1 of the the generalised version of Sanov’s Theorem given in Appendix A.
To apply the corollary, we must show that Γn(Rm1 ,λ,α,L)
H→Γ(R∗,λ,α,L).
First of all, we observe that by exploiting the continuity of the hc function and the density of rational
numbers into the real ones, it is easy to prove that Γn0 (Rm1 ,λ,α)
H→Γ0(R∗,λ,α). Then the Hausdorff
convergence of Γn(Rm1 ,λ,α,L) to Γ(R∗,λ,α,L) follows from the regularity properties of the set of
transportation maps stated in Appendix B. To see how, we observe that any transformation SPV ∈A(L,P )
mapping P into V can be applied in inverse order through the transformation SV P (i,j)=SPV (j,i). It is
also immediate to see that SV P introduces the same distortion introduced by SPV , that is SV P∈A(L,V ).
Let now P be a point in Γ(R∗,λ,α,L). By definition we can find a map SPV ∈A(L,P ) such that V ∈
Γ0(R
∗,λ,α). Since Γn0 (Rm1 ,λ,α)
H→Γ0(R∗,λ,α), for large enough n, we can find a point V ′∈Γn0 (Rm1 ,λ,α)
which is arbitrarily close to V . Thanks to the second part of Theorem 7 in Appendix B, we know that a
map SV ′P ′∈An(L,V ′) exists such that P ′ is arbitrarily close to P and P ′∈Pn. By applying the inverse
map SP ′V ′ to P ′, we see that P ′∈Γn(Rm1 ,λ,α,L), thus permitting us to conclude that, when n increases,
δΓ(R∗,λ,α,L)(Γ
n(Rm1 ,λ,α,L))→0. In a similar way, we can prove that δΓn(Rm1 ,λ,α,L)(Γ(R∗,λ,α,L))→0,
hence permitting us to conclude that Γn(Rm1 ,λ,α,L)
H→Γ(R∗,λ,α,L).
We can now apply the generalised version of Sanov Theorem as expressed in Corollary 1 of Appendix
A to conclude that:
− lim
n→∞
1
n
logPY (Γ
n(Rm1 ,λ,α,L)) = min
P∈Γ(R∗,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY ). (50)
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Going back to equation (49), and by exploiting the continuity of the divergence function, we can say
that for large n we have:
− logPfn
n
≤(1−α)cD(R∗||PX) + min
P∈Γ(R∗,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY )+νn, (51)
where the sequence νn tends to zero when n tends to infinity. By coupling equations (47) and (51) and
by letting n→∞, we eventually obtain:
− lim
n→∞
logPfn
n
=
min
R
[(1−α)c·D(R||PX)+ min
P∈Γ(R,λ,α,L)
D(P ||PY )], (52)
thus proving the theorem.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 2, the set Γ(PX ,λ,α,L) defines the indistinguishability
region of the test, that is the set of all the sources for which A induces D to decide in favour of H0 even
if H1 holds.
D. Analysis of the SIac-tr game
We now focus on the SIac-tr game. For a given choice of Q(Pτm1 )∈SA,T (and hence tm), given a
sequence yn, the optimum choice of the second part of the attack derives quite easily from the definition
of Λn×m,∗, namely
Sn,∗Y Z(Pyn ,Ptm)= (53)
arg min
SnY Z∈An(L,Pyn )
(
min
Q∈Pm2
h
(
Pzn ,
Ptm−αQ
1−α
))
.
Now the point is to determine the strategy Q(Pτm1 ) which maximises the probability that the attack in
(53) succeeds. To this purpose, of course, the attacker must exploit the knowledge of PY . Since solving
such a maximisation problem is not an easy task, we will proceed in a different way. We first introduce a
simple (and possibly suboptimum) strategy, then we argue that such a strategy is asymptotically optimum,
in that the set of the sources that cannot be distinguished from X with this choice is the same set that
we have obtained for the SIa,tc-tr setup, which is known to be more favourable to the attacker. More
specifically, we consider the following two-step attacking strategy. In the first step of the attack, A does
not know yn, hence he trusts the law of large numbers and optimises Q(Pτm1 ) by using PY as a proxy
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for Pyn . To do so, he applies equation (32), by replacing Pyn with PY . Specifically, by indicating with
Q†, the resulting strategy for the first step of the attack, we have
Q†(Pτm1 ) = arg min
Q∈Pm2
(54)
min
Q′∈Pm2
SY Z∈A(L,PY )
hc
(
PZ ,Pτm1 +
α
1−α(Q−Q
′)
)
. (55)
As a by-product of the above minimisation, the attacker also finds the map Sn,†Y Z representing the optimum
attack when Pyn=PY . Let us indicate the result of the application of such a map to PY by P
†
Z .
In the second part of the attack, A tries to move Pyn as close as possible to P
†
Z , that is:
Sn,†Y Z(Pyn ,P
†
tm) = arg min
SnY Z∈An(L,Pyn )
d(SnZ ,P
†
Z), (56)
where Sn,†Y Z(Pyn ,P
†
tm) depends upon the corrupted training sequence obtained after the application of the
first part of the attack, namely P †tm=(1−α)Pτm1 +αQ†(Pτm1 ), through P †Z .
The asymptotic optimality of the strategy (Q†(Pτm1 ), S
n,†
Y Z(Pyn ,P
†
tm)) derives from the following
theorem
Theorem 3 (Indistinguishability region of the SIac-tr game). The indistinguishability region of SIac-tr game
is equal to that of the SIa,tc-tr game (see eq. (42)) and is asymptotically achieved by the attacking strategy
(Q†(Pτm1 ), S
n,†
Y Z(Pyn ,P
†
tm)).
Proof (sketch). The theorem derives from the observation that due to the law of large numbers, when n
grows, Pyn tends to PY ; hence, for large enough n, optimising the first part of the attack by replacing
Pyn with PY does not introduce a significant performance loss. The rigorous proof goes along similar
lines to those used to prove Theorem 2 and ultimately relies on the continuity of the hc function and the
regularity properties of the set An(L,Pyn). The details of the proof are omitted for sake of brevity.
Given that asymptotic equivalence of the SIac-tr and the SI
a,t
c-tr games, in the rest of the paper, we will
generally refer to the SIac-tr game without specifying if we are considering the targeted or non-targeted
case.
V. SOURCE DISTINGUISHABILITY FOR THE SIac-tr GAME
In this section, we study the behaviour of the SIac-tr game when we vary the decay rate of the
false positive error probability λ. By letting λ tend to zero, in fact, we can derive the best achievable
performance of the defender when we require only that Pfp tends to zero exponentially fast regardless
of the decay rate. Then, we use such a result to derive the conditions under which the reliable distinction
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between two sources is possible in terms of number of corrupted training samples α and maximum
allowed distortion L.
A. Ultimate achievable performance of the game
As we said, the goal of this section is to study the limit of the indistinguishability region when λ→0.
This limit, in fact, determines all the pmf’s PY that can not be distinguished from PX ensuring that the
two types of error probabilities tend to zero exponentially fast (with vanishingly small, yet positive, error
exponents).
We start by exploiting optimal transport theory to rewrite the indistinguishability region as:
Γ(PX ,λ,α,L) = {P : ∃V ∈Γ0(PX ,λ,α) s.t. EMD(P,V )≤L}, (57)
where EMD (Earth Mover Distance) is the term used in computer vision to denote the minimum
transportation cost [19], [20], that is
EMD(P,V ) = min
SPV :SP=P,SV =V
∑
i,j
SPV (i,j)d(i,j). (58)
With this definition, the main result of this section is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given two sources X and Y , a maximum allowed average per-letter distortion L and a
fraction α of training samples provided by the attacker, the maximum achievable false negative error
exponent ε for the SIac-tr game is:
lim
λ→0
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log Pfn =
min
R
[(1−α)cD(R||PX) + min
P∈Γ(R,α,L)
D(P ||PY )], (59)
where Γ(R,α,L)=Γ(R,λ=0,α,L). Accordingly, the ultimate indistinguishability region is given by:
Γ(PX ,α,L)={P : ∃V ∈Γ0(PX ,α) s.t. EMD(P,V )≤L}, (60)
where Γ0(PX ,α)=Γ0(PX ,λ=0,α). Moreover, Γ(PX ,α,L) can be rewritten as:
Γ(PX ,α,L)=
{
P : min
V :EMD(P,V )≤L
∑
i
[V (i)–PX(i)]
+≤ α
(1−α)
}
=
{
P : min
V :EMD(P,V )≤L
dL1(V,PX) ≤
2α
(1−α)
}
.
(61)
with [a]+=max{a,0}.
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Proof. The proof of the first part goes along the same steps used in the proof of Theorems 3 and 4 in
[4] and is not repeated here. We show, instead, that Γ(PX ,α,L) can be rewritten as in (61).
By observing that hc(P,Q)=0 if and only if P=Q, it is immediate to see that the set Γ0(PX ,λ=0,α)
takes the following expression:
Γ0(PX ,α)={P : ∃Q,Q′∈P s.t. P = PX+ α
(1−α)(Q−Q
′)}. (62)
Expression (62) can be rewritten by avoiding the introduction of the auxiliary pmf’s Q and Q′. To do so,
we observe that Q(i) must be larger than Q′(i) for all the bins i for which P (i)>PX(i) (and viceversa).
In addition, Q and Q′ must be valid pmf’s, hence we have
∑
i[Q(i)−Q′(i)]+=
∑
i[Q
′(i)−Q(i)]+≤1.
Then, it is easy to see that (62) is equivalent to the following definition:
Γ0(PX ,α)=
{
P :
∑
i
[P (i)−PX(i)]+≤ α
(1−α)
}
(63)
=
{
P : dL1(P,PX)≤
2α
(1−α)
}
,
where the second equality follows by observing that dL1(P,PX)=
∑
i[P (i)−PX(i)]++
∑
i[PX(i)−P (i)]+.
Eventually, equation (61) derives immediately from the expression of Γ0(PX ,α) given in (63).
According to Theorem 4, Γ(PX ,α,L) provides the ultimate indistinguishability region of the test, that
is the set of all the pmf’s for which A wins the game.
Before going on, we pose to discuss the geometrical meaning of the set Γ0(PX ,α) in (62). To do so,
we introduce the set Λ∗0, obtained from Λ∗ by letting λ→∞:
Λ∗0=
{
(P,P ′): ∃Q s.t. P ′ = P−αQ
(1−α)
}
. (64)
As usual, we can fix the pmf P and define:
Λ∗0(P )=
{
P ′: ∃Q s.t. P ′ = P−αQ
(1−α)
}
. (65)
By referring to Figure 3 (left part), we can geometrically interpret Λ∗0(P ) as the set of the pmf’s P ′ such
that P is a convex combination (with coefficient α) of P ′ with a point Q of the probability simplex.
Starting from (43), we can then rewrite Γ0(PX ,α) as follows:
Γ0(PX ,α)={P : ∃Q∈P s.t. P∈Λ∗0((1−α)PX+αQ)}. (66)
Accordingly, Γ0(PX ,α) is geometrically obtained as the union of the acceptance regions built from the
points which can be written as a convex combination of PX with some point Q in the simplex. As
shown in the right part of Figure 3, such a region corresponds to an hexagon centred in PX , which, in
the probability simplex, is equivalent to the set of points whose L1 distance from PX is smaller than
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Λ∗0(P )
P
Q′
P ′
P ′
Q′
Λ∗0((1 − α)PX + αQ)
Q
PX
Γ0(PX , α)
(1 − α)PX + αQ
Fig. 3. Geometrical interpretation of Λ∗0(P ) (left) and geometrical construction of Γ0(PX ,α) (right). The size of the sets are
exaggerated for graphical purposes.
PX
Γ0(PX , α)
P
V
EMD(P, V ) < L
Γ(PX , α, L)
Fig. 4. Geometrical interpretation of Γ(PX ,α,L) as stated in Theorem 4.
or equal to 2α/(1−α) (as stated in (63)). Of course, only the points of the hexagon that lie inside the
simplex are valid pmf’s and then must be accounted for.
A pictorial representation of the set Γ(PX ,α,L) is given in Figure 4.
March 29, 2017 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. X, NO. X, XXXXXXX XXXX 27
B. Security margin and blinding corruption level (αb)
By a closer inspection of the ultimate indistinguishability region Γ(PX ,α,L), we can derive some
interesting parameters characterising the distinguishability of two sources in adversarial setting. Let X∼
PX and Y∼PY be two sources. Let us focus first on the case in which the attacker can not modify the
test sequence (L=0). In this situation, the ultimate indistinguishability region boils down to Γ0(PX ,α).
Then we conclude that D can tell the two sources apart if dL1(PY ,PX)>
2α
(1−α) . On the contrary, if
dL1(PY ,PX)≤ 2α(1−α) , A is able to make the sources indistinguishable by corrupting the training sequence.
Clearly, the larger the α the easier is for A to win the game. We can define the blinding corruption level
αb, as the minimum value of α for which two sources X and Y can not be distinguished. Specifically,
we have:
αb(PX ,PY ) =
dL1(PY ,PX)
2+dL1(PY ,PX)
=
∑
i[PY (i)−PX(i)]+
1+
∑
i[PY (i)−PX(i)]+
. (67)
From (67) it is easy to see that αb is always lower than 1/2, with the limit case αb=1/2 corresponding
to a situation in which PX and PY have completely disjoint supports10. It is interesting to notice that αb
is symmetric with respect to the two sources. Since the attacker is allowed only to add samples to the
training sequence without removing existing samples, this might seem a counterintuitive result. Actually,
the symmetry of αb is a consequence of the worst case approach adopted by the defender. In fact, D
itself discards a subset of samples from the training sequence in such a way to maximise the probability
that the remaining part of the training sequence and the test sequence have been drawn from the same
source.
Let us now consider the more general case in which L6=0. For a given α<αb, we look for the maximum
distortion allowed to A for which it is possible to reliably distinguish between the two sources. From
equation (61), we see that the attack does not succeed if:
min
V :EMD(PY ,V )≤L
dL1(V,PX) >
2α
(1−α) . (68)
This leads to the following definition, which extends the concept of security margin, introduced in [4],
to the more general setup considered in this paper.
Definition 3 (Security Margin in the SIac-tr setup). Let X∼PX and Y∼PY be two discrete memoryless
sources. The maximum distortion allowed to the attacker for which the two sources can be reliably
10We remind that for any pair of pmf’s (P,Q), dL1(P,Q) ≤ 2.
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PX
Γ0(PX , α) =
P : dL1(P, PX) ≤ 2α(1−α)

PY
{V :EMD(PY , V ) ≤ L∗α}
L∗α
Fig. 5. Geometrical interpretation of the Security Margin between two sources X and Y .
distinguished in the SIac-tr setup with a fraction α of possibly corrupted samples, is called Security
Margin and is given by
SMα(PX ,PY ) = L∗α, (69)
where L∗α=0 if PY ∈Γ0(PX ,α), while, if PY /∈Γ0(PX ,α), L∗α is the quantity which satisfies
min
V :EMD(PY ,V )≤L∗α
dL1(V,PX) =
2α
(1−α) . (70)
A geometric interpretation of L∗α is given in Figure 5. By focusing on the case PY /∈Γ0(PX ,α), and by
observing that
min
V :EMD(PY ,V )≤L
dL1(V,PX) (71)
is a monotonic non-increasing function of L, the security margin can be expressed in explicit form as
SMα(PX ,PY )=argmin
L′
min
V :EMD(PY ,V )≤L′
∣∣∣∣dL1(V,PX)− 2α(1−α)
∣∣∣∣. (72)
When L>SMα(PX ,PY ), it is not possible for D to distinguish between the two sources with positive
error exponents of the two kinds.
By looking at the behavior of the security margin as a function of α, we see that SMαb(PX ,PY )=0,
meaning that, whenever the fraction of corrupted samples reaches the critical value, the sources can not
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be distinguished even if the attacker does not introduce any distortion. On the contrary, setting α=0
corresponds to study the distinguishability of the sources with uncorrupted training; in this case we have
SM0(PX ,PY )=EMD(PX ,PY ), in agreement with [4]. With reference to Figure 5, it is easy to see that
when α=0 the hexagon representing Γ0(PX ,α) collapses into the single point PX and the security margin
corresponds to the Earth Mover Distance between Y and X . Eventually, we notice that, for α>0, the
value of the security margin in (72) is less than EMD(PX ,PY ). This is also an expected behaviour since
the general setting considered in this paper is more favourable to the attacker than the setting in [4].
By looking at (72), we can argue that the Security Margin is symmetric with respect to the two sources
X and Y , that is, SMα(PY ,PX)=SMα(PX ,PY ).
To show that this is the case, we observe that the pmf V ′ associated with the minimum L, for which
we have EMD(PY ,V ′)=SMα(PX ,PY ), can be obtained through the application of a map SPY V that
works as follows: it does not modify a portion α/(1−α) of PY and moves the remaining mass into an
equal amount of PX in a convenient way (i.e., in such a way to minimise the overall distance between the
masses). The inverse map can be applied to bring the same quantity of mass from PX to PY , while leaving
as is the remaining mass, thus obtaining a V ′′ which satisfies EMD(PX ,V ′′)=EMD(PY ,V ′) (because of
the symmetry of the per-symbol distortion d) and dL1(V
′′,PY )=dL1(V ′,PX)=2α/(1−α). Arguably, V ′′
is the pmf for which EMD(PX ,V ′′)=SMα(PY ,PX); hence, SMα(PY ,PX)=SMα(PX ,PY ).
1) Bernoulli sources: In order to get some insights on the practical meaning of αb and SMα, we
consider the simple case of two Bernoulli sources with parameter q=PX(1) and p=PY (1). Assuming
that no distortion is allowed to the attacker, the minimum fraction of samples that A must add to induce
a decision error is, according to (67), αb=
|p−q|
1+|p−q| . For instance, and rather obviously, when |p−q|=1, to
win the game A must introduce a number of fake samples equal to the number of samples of the correct
training sequence, i.e. α=0.5. With regard to SM, we have:
SMα(p,q)=
 |q−p|− α1−α α < αb0 α ≥ αb . (73)
Figure 6 illustrates the behavior of SMα(p,q) as a function of α when p=0.3 and q=0.7. The blinding
corruption value is αb=0.286.
VI. SOURCE IDENTIFICATION GAME WITH REPLACEMENT OF TRAINING SAMPLES
In this section, we study a variant of the game with corrupted training, in which A observes the training
sequence and can replace a selected fraction of samples. Let τm indicate the original m-sample long
training sequence drawn from X and let M be a subset of m2 = αm indexes in [1,2...m]. The attacker
can choose the index setM and replace the corresponding samples with m2 fake samples. More formally,
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Fig. 6. Security margin as a function of α for Bernoulli sources with parameters p=0.3 and q=0.7 (αb=0.286).
A
X
Y
yn
xn
τm z
n (d(zn, yn) < nL)
tm = σm(τm1M¯ ||τm2)
D
H0/H1
vn
Fig. 7. Block diagram of the SIrc-tr game (targeted corruption). Given the original training sequence τm, the adversary has
the possibility to replace a selected subset of m2 training samples with fake ones.
given the original training sequence τm, the training sequence seen by the defender is tm=σ(τm1M¯ ||τm2),
where M¯ is the complement of M in [1,2...m], τm1M¯ is the set of original (non-attacked) samples, and
τm2 is the sequence with the fake samples introduced by the attacker.
Figure 7 illustrates the adversarial setup considered in this section for the case of a targeted attack.
Arguably, this scenario is more favourable to the attacker with respect to the SIac-tr game.
A. Formal definition of the SIrc-tr game
In the sequel, we formally define the source identification game with replacement of selected samples,
namely the SIrc-tr game. As anticipated, we focus on a version of the game in which the corruption of
the training samples depends on the to-be-attacked sequence yn (targeted attack), the extension to the
case of non-target attack, in fact, can be easily obtained by following the same approach used in Section
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IV-D.
1) Defender’s strategies: As in the SIac-tr game, in order to be sure that the false positive error
probability is lower than 2−nλ, the defender adopts a worst case strategy and considers the maximum
of the false positive error probability over all the possible PX and over all the possible attacks that the
training sequence may have undergone, yielding:
SD={Λn×m⊂Pn×Pm: max
PX∈P
max
s∈SA,T
Pfp ≤ 2−λn}. (74)
While the above expression is formally equal to that of the SIac-tr game (see eq. (15)), the maximisation
over SA,T is now more cumbersome, due to the additional degree of freedom available to the attacker,
who can selectively remove the samples of the original training sequence. In fact, even if D knew the
position of the corrupted samples, simply throwing them away would not guarantee that the remaining
part of the sequence would follow the same statistics of X , since the attacker might have deliberately
altered them by selectively choosing the samples to replace.
2) Attacker’s strategies: With regard to the attacker, the part of the attack working on the test sequence
yn is the same as for the SIac-tr case, while the part regarding the corruption of the training sequence must
be redefined. To this purpose, we observe that the corrupted training sequence may be any sequence tm
for which dH(tm,τm)≤αm, where dH denotes the Hamming distance. Given that the defender basis his
decision on the type of tm, it is convenient to rewrite the constraint on the Hamming distance between
sequences as a constraint on the L1 distance between the corresponding types. In fact, by looking at the
empirical distribution of the corrupted sequence, searching for a sequence tm s.t. dH(tm,τm)≤αm is
equivalent to searching for a pmf Ptm∈Pm for which dL1(Ptm ,Pτm)≤2α (see the proof of Lemma 2 in
[2]). Therefore, the set of strategies of the attacker is defined by SA=SA,T×SA,O, where
SA,T = {Q(Pτm ,Pyn): Pm×Pn→Pm
such that dL1(Q(Pτm ,Pyn),Pτm) ≤ 2α}, (75)
SA,O = {SnY Z(Pyn ,Ptm): Pn×Pm→An(L,Pyn)}. (76)
Note that, in this case, the function Q(·,·) gives the type of the whole training sequence observed by D
(not only the fake subpart, as it was in the SIac-tr game), that is, Ptm=Q(Pτm ,Pyn).
In the following, we will find convenient to express the attacking strategies in SA,T in an alternative
way. Since the attacker replaces the samples of a subpart of the training sequence, the corruption strategy
is equivalent to first removing a subpart of the training sequence and then adding a fake subsequence of
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the same length. Then, the sequence is reordered to hide the position of the fake samples. By focusing
on the type of the observed training sequence, we can write:
Ptm = Pτm−αQR(Pτm ,Pyn)+αQA(Pτm ,Pyn). (77)
where QR(Pτm ,Pyn) and QA(Pτm ,Pyn) (both belonging to Pm2) are the types of the removed and
injected subsequences respectively. In order to simplify the notation, in the following we will avoid to
indicate explicitly the dependence of QR(Pτm ,Pyn) and QA(Pτm ,Pyn) on Pτm , Pyn , and will indicate
them as QR() and QA(). Furthermore, we will use notation QR and QA whenever the dependence from
the arguments is not relevant. By varying QR and QA, we obtain all the pmf’s that can be produced from
Pτm by first removing and later adding m2 samples. Of course not all pairs (QR, QA) are admissible
since the Ptm resulting from eq. (77) must be a valid pmf, i.e. it must be nonnegative for all the symbols
of the alphabet X .
3) Payoff: As usual, the payoff function is defined as
u(Λn×m,(QR(),QA(),SnY Z())) = −Pfn. (78)
B. Equilibrium point and payoff at the equilibrium
In order to ensure that Pfp is always lower than 2−λn , it is convenient to use the attack formulation
given in (77). For a given PX , QR and QA, Pfp is the probability that X generates two sequences xn
and τm, such that the pair of type classes (Pxn ,Pτm−α(QR()−QA())) falls outside Λn×m. Accordingly,
the set of strategies available to D can be rewritten as:
SD=
{
Λn×m: max
PX∈P
max
QR(),QA()
∑
Pyn∈Pn
PY (T (Pyn))· (79)
∑
(Pxn ,Ptm )∈Λ¯n×m
PX(T (Pxn)) ·
∑
Pτm∈Pm:
Pτm−α(QR()−QA())=Ptm
PX(T (Pτm)) ≤ 2−λn
}
.
By proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 1, it is easy to prove that the asymptotically optimum strategy
for the defender corresponds to the following:
Λn×m,∗ =
{
(Pxn ,Ptm):
min
QR,QA∈Pm2
h(Pxn ,Ptm+α(QR−QA))≤ λ−δn
}
, (80)
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where δn tends to 0 as n→∞ and the minimization is limited to QR and QA in Pm2 such that Ptm+
α(QR−QA) is a valid pmf. Consequently, the optimum attacking strategy is given by:
(Q∗(Pτm ,Pyn), S
n,∗
Y Z(Pyn ,Ptm)) =
argmin
Ptm s.t. dL1 (Ptm ,Pτm )≤2α
SnY Z∈An(L,Pyn )
[
min
QR,QA
h(Pzn ,Ptm+α(QR−QA))
]
, (81)
hence resulting in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The SIrc-tr game with targeted corruption is a dominance solvable game, whose only
rationalizable equilibrium corresponds to the profile (Λn×m,∗,(Q∗(), Sn,∗Y Z())) given by equations (80)
and (81).
In order to study the asymptotic payoff of the SIrc-tr game at the equilibrium, we parallel the analysis
carried out in Sec. IV-C. By considering the case L=0, the set of pairs of types for which D will accept
H0 as a consequence of the attack to the training sequence is given by
Γn0 (λ,α) = {(Pyn ,Pτm):
∃Ptm s.t. dL1(Ptm ,Pτm) ≤ 2α
and (Pyn ,Ptm) ∈ Λn×m,∗}. (82)
If we fix the type of the original training sequence, we get:
Γn0 (Pτm ,λ,α) = {Pyn : ∃Ptm s.t. dL1(Ptm ,Pτm) ≤ 2α
and Pyn∈Λn,∗(Ptm)}
= {Pyn : ∃Ptm , ∃Q,Q′∈Pm2 , s.t. (83)
dL1(Ptm ,Pτm)≤2α
and h(Pxn ,Ptm−αQ′+αQ)≤λ−δn}.
By letting n go to infinity, we obtain the asymptotic counterpart of the above set, which, for a generic
R∈P , takes the following expression:
Γ0(R,λ,α) =
{
P : ∃P ′,Q,Q′, s.t. dL1(P ′,R) ≤ 2α
and hc(P,P ′−αQ′+αQ) ≤ λ
}
. (84)
When L6=0, we obtain:
Γ(R,λ,α,L) = {P : ∃V ∈Γ0(R,λ,α) s.t. EMD(P,V ) ≤ L}. (85)
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With the above definitions, it is straightforward to extend Theorem 2 to the SIrc-tr case, thus proving
that the set in (85) evaluated in R = PX represents the indistinguishability region of the SIrc-tr game.
C. Security margin and blinding corruption level
As a last contribution, we are interested in studying the ultimate distinguishability of two sources X
and Y in the SIrc-tr setting and compare it with the result we have obtained for the SI
a
c-tr case. To do
so, we consider the behaviour of the indistinguishability region when λ tends to 0. We have:
Γ(PX ,α,L) = {P : ∃V ∈Γ0(PX ,α) s.t. EMD(P,V ) ≤ L}, (86)
where
Γ0(PX ,α) =
{
P : ∃P ′,Q,Q′ s.t. dL1(P ′,PX) ≤ 2α
and P = P ′+α(Q−Q′)}
=
{
P : ∃P ′ s.t. dL1(P ′,PX) ≤ 2α
and dL1(P,P
′) ≤ 2α}. (87)
The set in (87) can be equivalently rewritten as
Γ0(PX ,α) =
{
P : dL1(P,PX) ≤ 4α
}
. (88)
To see why, we first notice that set (87) is contained in (88). Indeed, from the triangular inequality
we have that, for any P ′, d(P,PX) ≤ dL1(P,P ′)+dL1(P ′,PX). Then, if P belongs to Γ0(PX ,α) in (87),
it also belongs to the set in (88). To see that the two sets are indeed equivalent, it is sufficient to show
that the reverse implication also holds. To this purpose, we observe that, whenever dL1(P,PX) ≤ 4α, a
type P ∗ can be found such that its distance from both P and PX is less or at most equal to 2α. In fact,
by letting P ∗ = P+PX2 , we have
dL1(P,P
∗) = dL1(P
∗,PX) =
∑
i
∣∣∣∣P (i)−PX(i)2
∣∣∣∣
dL1(P,PX) =
∑
i
∣∣∣∣PX(i)−P (i)∣∣∣∣ = 2dL1(P,P ∗). (89)
If dL1(P,PX) ≤ 4α, then, dL1(P,P ∗) = dL1(P ∗,PX) = dL1(P,PX)/2 ≤ 2α, permitting us to conclude
that the sets in (87) and (88) are equivalent.
Upon inspection of equation (88), we can conclude that, as expected, the indistinguishability region for
L=0 (and hence, also for the case L6=0) is larger than that of the SIac-tr game (see (63)), thus confirming
that the game with sample replacement is more favourable to the attacker (a graphical comparison between
March 29, 2017 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. X, NO. X, XXXXXXX XXXX 35
PX
Γ0(PX , α) =
P : dL1(P, PX) ≤ 2α(1−α)

Γ0,c(PX , α) = {P : dL1(P, PX) ≤ 4α}
Fig. 8. Comparison of the indistinguishability regions for the SIac-tr and SIrc-tr games with L=0.
the indistinguishability regions for the two setups is shown in Figure 8). As a matter of fact, for the
attacker, the advantage of the SIrc-tr game with respect to the SI
a
c-tr game depends on α. For small
α and for α close to 1/2, the indistinguishability regions of the two games are very similar, while for
intermediate values of α the indistinguishability region of the SIrc-tr game is considerably larger than
that of the SIac-tr game (the maximum difference between the two regions is obtained for α≈0.3). When
α=1/2 the attacker always wins, since he is able to bring any pmf inside the acceptance region regardless
of the game version, while for α=0, we fall back into the source identification game without corruption
of the training sequence, thus making the two versions of the game equivalent.
Given two sources X and Y , the blinding corruption level value takes the expression:
αb =
dL1(PY ,PX)
4
. (90)
Since dL1(PY ,PX)≤2 for any couple (PY ,PX) (the maximum value 2 is taken when the two distribution
have disjoint support), the blinding value for the SIrc-tr game is lower than the blinding value of
SIac-tr game. The two expressions are identical when the two sources have disjoint support, in which
case αb=1/2.
When the attacker can also corrupt the test sequence, the ultimate indistinguishability region of the
SIrc-trgame is:
Γ(PX ,α,L) =
{
P : min
V :EMD(P,V )≤L
dL1(V,PX) ≤ 4α
}
. (91)
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Fig. 9. Security margin as a function of α for Bernoulli sources with parameters p=0.3 and q=0.7 (αb=0.1).
Starting from (91) we can define the security margin in the SIrc-tr setup.
Definition 4 (Security Margin in the SIrc-tr setup). Let X∼PX and Y∼PY be two discrete memory-
less sources. The maximum distortion for which the two sources can be reliably distinguished in the
SIrc-tr setup is called Security Margin and is given by
SMα(PX ,PY )=L∗α, (92)
where L∗α is the quantity which satisfies the following relation
min
V :EMD(PY ,V )≤L∗α
dL1(V,PX) = 4α, (93)
if PY /∈Γ0(PX ,α), and L∗α=0 otherwise.
Considering again the case of two Bernoulli sources and by adopting the same notation of Section
V-B1, we have that αb=|p−q|/4, while the security margin is
SMα(p,q)=
 |q−p|−2α α < αb0 α ≥ αb . (94)
Figure 6 plots SMα as a function of α when p=0.3 and q=0.7. The blinding value is αb=0.1 which,
as expected, is lower than the value we found for the SIac-tr setup.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the distinguishability of two sources in an adversarial setup when the sources are known
through training data, part of which can be corrupted by the attacker himself. We considered two different
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scenarios. In the first one, the attacker simply adds fake samples to the original training sequence, while in
the second one, the attacker replaces a selected subset of training samples with fake ones. We formalised
both cases in a game-theoretic setup, then we derived the equilibrium point of the games and analysed
the (asymptotic) payoff at the equilibrium. The result of the game can be summarised in a compact and
elegant way by introducing two parameters, namely the Security Margin under corruption of the training
sequence, and the blinding corruption level αb, defined as the portion of fake samples the attacker must
introduce to make impossible any reliable distinction between the sources. Based on these two parameters,
the performance of the two games with corruption of the training data can be easily compared.
Though rather theoretical, our findings can guide more practical researches in several fields belonging
to the emerging areas of adversarial signal processing [1] and secure machine learning [6]. In many cases,
in fact, the defender must take into account the possibility that the data he is using to tune the system
he is working at, or during the learning phase, is corrupted by the attacker.
The analysis carried out in this paper can be extended in several ways, for instance by considering
continuous sources, or by assuming that the sources X and Y are not memoryless, but still amenable to
be studied by using the method of types [21]. Following the analysis in [22], we could also consider a
more general setup in which the attacker is active under both H0 and H1. An interesting generalisation,
consists in studying a symmetric setup in which the training and the test sequences can be corrupted by
applying the same kinds of processing. For instance, the attacker could be allowed to replace samples
in both the training and the set sequences, or he could be allowed to modify the training sequence up
to a certain distortion. Other kinds of attacks to the training data could also be considered, like sample
removal with no addition of fake samples. As a matter of fact, the kind of attack strongly depends on
the application scenario, and it is arguable that the availability of a large variety of theoretical models
would help bridging the gap between theory and practice.
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APPENDIX
A. Generalized Sanov’s theorem
Let us consider a sequence of n i.i.d. discrete random variables taking values in a finite alphabet X
and distributed according to a pmf P . We denote with Pn the empirical pmf of the sequence. Let E⊆P
be a set of pmf’s. Sanov’s theorem [8], [23], [9] states that
inf
Q∈E
D(Q||P ) ≤ −lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈E)
≤ −lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈E)
≤ inf
Q∈int E
D(Q||P ), (A1)
where int S denote the interior part of the set S.
When cl(E) = cl(int(E))11, or, E ⊆ cl(int(E)), the left and right-hand side of (A1) coincide and we
get the exact rate:
− lim
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈E) = inf
Q∈E
D(Q||P ). (A2)
If we define the set En=E∩Pn, we have: P (Pn∈E)=P (Pn∈En) and we can rewrite Sanov’s theorem
as:
inf
Q∈E
D(Q||P ) ≤ −lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈En)
≤ −lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈En)
≤ inf
Q∈int E
D(Q||P ), (A3)
Note that, by construction, we have cl(E) = cl(∪nEn).
In the following, we extend the formulation of Sanov’s theorem given in (A3) to more general sequences
of sets En for which it does not necessary hold that En=E∩Pn for some set E.
We start by introducing the notion of convergence for sequences of subsets due to Kuratowsky, which
is a more general notion of convergence with respect to the one based on Hausdorff distance. Let (S,d)
be a metric space. We first provide the definition of lower closed limit or Kuratowski limit inferior [24].
11cl(E) denotes the closure of E. Clearly, cl(E) ≡ E if E is a closed set.
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Definition 5. A point p belongs to the lower limit Li
n→∞Kn (or simply LiKn) of a sequence of sets Kn,
if every neighborhood of p intersects all the Kn’s from a sufficiently great index n onward.
Given the above definition, the expression p ∈ Li
n→∞Kn is equivalent to the existence of a sequence of
points {pn} such that:
p = lim
n→∞pn, pn∈Kn. (A4)
Stated in another way, LiKn is the set of the accumulation points of sequences in Kn. As an alternative,
equivalent, definition we can let:
Li
n→∞Kn = {p ∈ X s.t. lim supn→∞ d(x,Kn) = 0}. (A5)
Similarly, we have the following definition of upper closed limit or Kuratowski limit superior [24].
Definition 6. A point p belongs to the upper limit Ls
n→∞Kn (or simply LsKn) of a sequence of sets Kn,
if every neighborhood of p intersects an infinite number of terms in Kn.
The expression p ∈ Lsn→∞Kn is equivalent to the existence of a subsequence of points {pkn} such
that
k1<k2<..., p = lim
n→∞pkn , pkn∈ Kkn .
As an alternative, equivalent, definition we can let:
Ls
n→∞Kn = {p ∈ X s.t. lim infn→∞ d(x,Kn) = 0}. (A6)
It can be proven that the Kuratowski limit inferior and superior are always closed set (see [24]).
Given the above, we can state the following:
Definition 7. The sequence of sets {Kn} is said to be convergent to K in the sense of Kuratowski, that
is Kn
K→ K, if LiKn=K=LsKn, in which case we write K=LimKn.
We observe that Kuratowski convergence is weaker than convergence in Hausdorff metric; in fact,
given a sequence of closed sets {Kn}, Kn H→ K implies Kn K→ K [25]. For compact metric spaces, the
reverse implication also holds and the two kinds of convergence coincide.
In this work, we are interested in the space P of probability mass functions defined over a finite
alphabet X , i.e., the probability simplex in R|X |, equipped with the L1 metric. Being P a closed subset
of R|X |, P is a complete set. In addition, with the L1 metric, P∈L(R|X |), that is, P is bounded. The
space (P,dL1), then, is a compact metric space and then, for our purposes, Kuratowski and Hausdorff
convergence are equivalent.
We are now ready to prove the following generalisation of Sanov’s theorem:
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Theorem 6 (Generalized Sanov’s theorem). Let {E(n)} be a sequence of sets in P , such that Li(E(n)∩
Pn) 6= ∅. Then:
min
Q∈ LsE(n)
D(Q||P ) ≤ −limsup
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈E(n))
≤ −liminf
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈E(n))
≤ min
Q∈ Li (E(n)∩Pn)
D(Q||P ), (A7)
If, in addition, LsE(n)=Li(E(n)∩Pn), the generalized Sanov’s limit exists as follows:
− lim
n→∞
1
n
logP (Pn∈E(n)) = min
Q∈LimE(n)
D(Q||P ). (A8)
Proof. We first prove the expression for the lower bound. Let En = E(n)∩Pn. We have:
P (E(n)) =
∑
Q∈En
PX(T (Q))
≤ (n+1)|X |2−nminQ∈EnD(Q||P )
≤ (n+1)|X |2−ninfQ∈E(n)D(Q||P )
= (n+1)|X |2−nminQ∈cl(E(n))D(Q||P ). (A9)
In the last inequality we exploited the fact that, being each E(n) a bounded set of P , and D lower bounded
in P , the infimum over E(n) corresponds to the minimum over its closure. By taking the logarithm of
each side and dividing by n, we get:
1
n
logP (E(n)) ≤ − min
Q∈cl(E(n))
D(Q||P )+log(n+1)
|X |
n
, (A10)
We now prove that, for any δ and for sufficiently large n, we have
min
Q∈cl(E(n))
D(Q||P ) ≥ min
Q∈LsE(n)
D(Q||P ) − δ. (A11)
First, according to the properties of the limit superior, LsE(n)=Ls(cl(E(n))) [24], hence proving (A11)
is equivalent to showing that:
min
Q∈cl(E(n))
D(Q||P ) ≥ min
Q∈Ls(cl(E(n)))
D(Q||P ) − δ. (A12)
Let Qn be the sequence of points achieving the minimum of the left-hand side of (A12) (for simplicity
we assume that the minimum is unique, the extension to a more general case being straightforward). Let
Qn(j) be a subsequence of Qn formed only by the elements of Qn that do not belong to Ls(cl(E(n)))12.
If the number of elements in Qn(j) is finite, then for n large enough Qn ∈ Ls(cl(E(n))) and eq. (A12) is
12 n(i) > n(j),∀i > j
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verified with δ=0. If the number of elements in Qn(j) is infinite, then, due to the boundedness of P , the
elements of Qn(j) must have at least one accumulation point (Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem). Let Ai’s be
the accumulation points of Qn(j). By definition of Ls, all Ai’s belong to Ls(cl(E(n))). In addition, for
any radius ρ, from a certain j on, all the points in Qn(j) belong to R=
⋃
iB(Ai,ρ)13. For large enough
n, then we have:
min
Q∈cl(E(n))
D(Q||P ) ≥ min
Q∈Ls(cl(E(n)))∪R
D(Q||P ) (A13)
≥ min
Q∈Ls(cl(E(n)))
D(Q||P ) − δ,
where the second inequality derives from the continuity of the D function and the arbitrariness of ρ.
By inserting equation (A11) in (A10), we have that, for large n,
1
n
logP (E(n))≤− min
Q∈LsE(n)
D(Q||P )+log(n+1)
|X |
n
+δ, (A14)
and hence, by the arbitrariness of δ,
−limsup
n→∞
1
n
logP (E(n)) ≥ min
Q∈LsE(n)
D(Q||P ). (A15)
We now pass to the upper bound. Let Q∗ be a point achieving the minimum of the divergence over
the set LiEn. By definition of limit inferior, there exists a sequence of points {Qn}, Qn∈En such that
Qn→Q∗ as n→∞. Then, by exploiting the continuity of D, it follows that:
D(Qn||P ) ≤ D(Q∗||P ) + γ, (A16)
where γ can be made arbitrarily small for large n. We can then write:
P (E(n)) =
∑
Q∈En
P (T (Q))
≥ P (T (Qn)) ≥ 2
−nD(Qn||P )
(n+1)|X |
. (A17)
Hence, we get
1
n
logP (E(n)) ≥ −D(Qn||P ) − |X |
log(n+1)
n
,
≥ −D(Q∗||P ) − γ − |X | log(n+1)
n
,
≥ − min
Q∈LiEn
D(Q||P ) − γ − |X | log(n+1)
n
, (A18)
13B(Ai,ρ) is a ball with radius ρ centred in Ai.
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and then, by the arbitrariness of γ,
− liminf
n→∞
1
n
logP (E(n)) ≤ min
Q∈LiEn
D(Q||P ), (A19)
which concludes the proof of the first part (relation (A7)).
For the proof of the second part, we observe that, when LsE(n)=Li(E(n)∩Pn), the two bounds
in (A7) coincides. Moreover, the following chain of inclusions holds, LiE(n) ⊆ LsE(n) = Li(E(n)∩
Pn) ⊆ LiE(n), and then LiE(n) = LsE(n) = LimE(n), yielding (A8).
We observe that, in general, the Kuratowski convergence of E(n) is a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of the generalized Sanov limit in (A8), but it is not sufficient. In fact, we could have LiE(n) ⊇ Li(E(n)∩
Pn), in which case the lower and upper bound in (A7) do not coincide. It is also interesting to notice
that when E(n) ∈ Pn is a sequence of sets in Pn, then Sanov’s limit holds whenever E(n) K→E for some
set E, or, by exploiting the compactness of P , E(n) H→E. Based on the above observation, we can state
the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Let E(n) be a sequence of sets in Pn, such that E(n) H→E. Then:
− lim
n→∞
1
n
log P (Pn∈E(n)) = min
Q∈E
D(Q||P ). (A20)
B. Regularity properties of the set of admissible maps
To prove the theorems on the asymptotic behaviour of the payoff in the two versions of the source
identification game studied in this paper, we need to prove some regularity theorems on the set of
admissible maps.
To start with, we need to define a distance between transportation maps, that is a function ds: R|X |×|X |×
R|X |×|X |→R+. In accordance with the rest of the paper, let us choose the L1 distance, that is, given two
maps (SPV ,SQR), we define ds(SPV ,SQR)=
∑
i,j |SPV (i,j)−SQR(i,j)|.
Our first result regards the regularity of A(L,P ) as a function of P .
Lemma 2. Let P∈P and let P ′ be any pmf in the neighbourhood of P of radius τ , i.e., P ′∈B(P,τ).
Then
δH(A(L,P ), A(L,P ′)) ≤ τ
and hence lim
τ→0
δH(A(L,P ),A(L,P ′)) = 0, uniformly in P .
Moreover, if we insist that P ′∈Pn, the following result holds: ∀ε>0, ∃τ∗ and n∗ such that ∀τ<τ∗ and
n>n∗,
δH(A(L,P ), An(L,P ′)) ≤ ε ∀P ′∈B(P,τ)∩Pn, ∀P∈P.
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Proof. From a general perspective, the lemma follows from the fact that An(L,Pyn) (and A(L,P )) is
built by imposing a number of linear constraints on the admissible transportation maps (see eq. (11)), i.e.
A(L,P ) is a convex polytope [26], [27]. By considering a P ′ close to P , we are perturbing the vector
of the known terms of the linear constraints which defines the admissibility set. Instead of invoking the
above general principle, in the following we give an explicit proof of the lemma.
Given P∈P and P ′∈B(P,τ), let τ(i)=P (i)−P ′(i) be the excess (or defect) of mass of P with respect
to P ′ in bin i. For any map in A(L,P ), we can choose a map SP ′V ′ that works as follows: for the bins i
such that τ(i)≤0, let SP ′V ′(i,j)=SPV (i,j) for j 6=i, while for j=i, we let SP ′V ′(i,j)=SPV (i,j)+|τ(i)|.
For the bins i for which τ(i)>0, we first sort the index set {j:SPV (i,j)6=0} in decreasing order with
respect to the amount of distortion introduced per unit of mass delivered from i to j (d(i,j)). Then, starting
from the first index in the ordered list, we let SP ′V ′(i,j)=max(0, SPV (i,j)−τ(i)). If SP ′V ′(i,j)=0, we
update τ(i) to a new value τ ′(i)=τ(i)−SPV (i,j), and iterate the previous procedure by subtracting the
updated value of τ ′(i) from the second SPV (i,j) in the list. This procedure goes on until the subtraction
gives SP ′V ′(i,j)6=0, that is when we have removed all the excess mass from the i-th row of SPV (i,j).
It is easy to see that the map built in this way satisfies the distortion constraint, in fact, by construc-
tion the distortion associated to SP ′V ′ is less than that introduced by SPV . Then, SP ′V ′∈A(L,P ′). In
addition, by construction,
∑
j |SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)|≤|τ(i)|, and hence
∑
ij |SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)|≤τ .
Accordingly, we have:
δA(L,P )(A(L,P ′))= (A21)
max
SPV ∈A(L,P )
min
SP ′V ′∈A(L,P ′)
ds(SPV ,SP ′V ′) ≤ τ
since, as we have shown with the preceding construction, the inner minimum is always lower or equal
than τ . By repeating the same argument exchanging the role of A(L,P ) and A(L,P ′), we find that
δH(A(L,P ′),A(L,P ))≤τ , thus concluding the first part of the proof.
In the second part of the lemma, we require that P ′∈Pn and that the map produces a sequence in
Pn. The proof is easily achieved by exploiting the first part of the lemma according to which for any
map SPV in A(L,P ), we can find a map SP ′V ′ in A(L,P ′) which is arbitrarily close to SPV , and
then approximating SP ′V ′ with a map SnP ′V ′∈An(L,P ′). Due to the density of rational numbers in real
numbers, such an approximation can be made arbitrarily accurate by increasing n, thus completing the
proof.
Given a transformation SPV mapping P into V , Lemma 2 states that, for any pmf P ′ close to P , we
can find a map SP ′V ′ close to SPV . The following theorem extends such a result to the pmf resulting
from the application of the mapping.
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Theorem 7. Let P∈P , and let P ′ be any pmf in the neighbourhood of P of radius τ , i.e., P ′∈B(P,τ).
Let SPV ∈A(L,P ). Then, we can always find a map SP ′V ′∈A(L,P ′) such that V ′∈B(V,τ).
Similarly, for any ε>0, there exist τ∗ and n∗ such that ∀ τ<τ∗ and n>n∗, given a P∈P , a map
SPV ∈A(L,P ) and P ′∈Pn∩B(P,τ), we can find a map SnP ′V ′ in An(L,P ′) such that V ′n∈B(V,ε)∩Pn.
Proof. For any two maps SPV and SP ′V ′ , we have:
V ′(j) =
∑
i
SP ′V ′(i,j)
=
∑
i
(SPV (i,j)+(SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)))
≤ V (j)+
∑
i
|SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)|, (A22)
and
V ′(j) =
∑
i
SP ′V ′(i,j)
=
∑
i
(SPV (i,j)+(SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)))
≥ V (j)−
∑
i
|SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)|, (A23)
yielding:
|V ′(j)−V (j)| ≤
∑
i
|SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)|. (A24)
By summing over j and exploiting Lemma 2, we can choose SP ′V ′ so that:
∑
j
|V ′(j)−V (j)| ≤
∑
i,j
|SP ′V ′(i,j)−SPV (i,j)|
≤ δH(A(L,P ′), A(L,P )) ≤ τ, (A25)
and hence V ′∈B(V,|τ).
Similarly to the second part of Lemma 2, the second part of the theorem follows immediately from
the density of rational numbers in the real line.
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